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Coniston Corp v Village of Hoffman Hills:
How to Make Procedural Due Process Disappear
Richard A. Epsteint
I. INTRODUCTION: A HOLMES DISCIPLE
It is an honor to join so many distinguished colleagues in the
grand celebration of Richard A. Posner's twenty-five years as a judge
on the Seventh Circuit. His broad intellect, economical style, and tre-
mendous productivity from the bench-not to mention his Herculean
achievements as a scholar-make him the most influential appellate
court judge of our generation. As befits this occasion, however, I see
no reason to examine one of his many opinions with which I agree.
Rather, as befits our relationship of now thirty-five years, I choose to
write about a highly influential Posner opinion with which I and, I ex-
pect, many others disagree: Coniston Corp v Village of Hoffman Es-
tates.' That case offers more latitude to local government officials on
land use decisions than is commonly found in most courts, and it is in
my view all too sympathetic to the claims of expertise and discretion
advanced on behalf of land planners.
To set the stage, here are the simple facts of the underlying dis-
pute. Coniston had acquired several hundred acres of undeveloped
land near the Village of Hoffman Estates, which were then annexed to
the Village by mutual agreement. The parties took the unusual step of
incorporating the Village's land use ordinance into that annexation
agreement. The agreement did not set out specific procedures for re-
viewing any application to develop that parcel, but it did require Conis-
ton to develop a general plan for the entire tract, which it did, and to
prepare more specific site plans for each section of the entire plot prior
to its development. The master agreement first sent each particular plan
to a Village Plan Commission whose recommendations were passed on
to the Village Board of Trustees for its approval or disapproval.
t James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, The University of Chicago;
The Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution. My thanks to Dennis
Hutchinson and Geoffrey R. Stone for their insightful comments on an earlier draft of this paper,
and to David Strandness of the Stanford Law School, Class of 2007 for his usual expert research
assistance.
1 844 F2d 461 (7th Cir 1988).
2 Id at 462.
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Coniston used this method to secure approval for several tract
developments. This litigation arose when Coniston presented to the
Plan Commission a proposal to put five one-story commercial build-
ings on seventeen acres of land, with a total square footage of 181,000
square feet. This time, however, the Village Board of Trustees balked
after receiving a detailed favorable recommendation from the Plan
Commission. Initially, it denied the proposal without giving any rea-
sons for departing from the recommendation, although one trustee
did express the view (her view, at least) that the Village already had
too much unrented office space. Pressed by Coniston to review its first
decision, the Board went into executive session after which it stuck to
its earlier decision, again without explanation.' Obviously miffed,
Coniston brought a § 1983 action challenging the decision under the
Due Process Clause, while waiving, at least initially, any takings claim
with respect to the permit denial. Judge Norgle dismissed the suit in
an unreported opinion, and Judge Posner affirmed that decision-
Judges Coffey and Easterbrook, concurring-in a provocative, wide-
ranging, elegant, and ultimately unsatisfying opinion.
Before analyzing Coniston's particulars, it is important to recall
that Posner's larger constitutional vision generally takes its cue from
Oliver Wendell Holmes,' but more from the deferential Holmes of
Lochner v New York,' and less from the conflicted Holmes of Penn-
sylvania Coal Co v Mahon.' Posner never lacks for self-confidence in
making up his mind about legal matters, both great and small. He has
that rare knack of cutting right to the heart of any issue, and uses his
economic sophistication to expose the foolishness of those who don't
get the efficiency of the common law or the importance of free and
open competition in the marketplace. Yet when the topic shifts to con-
stitutional law, the judicial champion of the Hand formula, which re-
quires an open-ended judicial balancing of costs and benefits, uses all
his intellectual firepower to explain why courts can't make the multi-
3 Id at 462-63.
4 Id.
5 For the affinity, see generally Richard A. Posner, ed, The Essential Holmes: Selections
from the Letters, Speeches, Judicial Opinions and Other Writings of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
(Chicago 1996).
6 198 US 45 (1905) (finding that the state did not have the constitutional authority to
regulate the number of hours a baker can work).
7 260 US 393 (1922) (finding that prohibiting a party from exercising its contractual right to
mine coal if doing so causes subsidence to dwelling houses constitutes an unconstitutional taking).
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ple considerations of "distributive and corrective justice" needed to
pass on the constitutionality of various government actions.
In taking this constitutional posture, Posner is, of course, bound as
a lower court judge to follow the Supreme Court's lead. But in this
instance, he shows more deference to local government officials than
any Supreme Court precedent requires. Like Holmes, he does not take
this stance like some progressive justices-think of Louis Brandeis or
William Brennan-who actually favor the legislative initiatives that
they shield from constitutional attack. Quite the opposite, Posner
loves to expose the folly of statutes whose constitutionality he pas-
sionately defends, as, for example, in his powerful economic critique of
an ill-considered Chicago rent control ordinance.' Nor does Posner
suffer from an unaccountable blind spot to risks that protectionism
and anticompetitive activities pose to economic well-being." And he
never stoops to making silly empirical claims to justify perverse eco-
nomic regulation. His stock in trade is the outlandish demurrer, not
the meek denial. His deep conviction is that our Constitution allows a
myriad of foolish and misguided legislative schemes that only knaves
would support. He is "brutal"-one of Posner's famous words-about
the underlying realities, just like his hero, Holmes.
These strong tendencies in Posner's constitutional thought pre-
date Coniston. The futility of Coniston's procedural and substantive
due process claims offers only further testimony to Posner's relentless
intellectual consistency. One wag has suggested that Posner's constitu-
tion really reads, "Any person may be deprived of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law." This is how Coniston reads.
The short description of Coniston supplied above should make it
evident that the procedural due process argument relating to the
Board's arbitrary and capricious judgment is the pivotal point in the
case. But for powerful rhetorical reasons, Posner chooses to set the
stage with an extended digression meant to place his stamp on the
entire field of property-related constitutional claims. In sequence, he
starts with takings, moves on to substantive due process, both dicta,
only to decide the case by rejecting Coniston's procedural due process
8 Coniston, 844 F2d at 468 (arguing that legislatures are better suited than courts to make
zoning decisions because the various criteria for such decisions are too "open-ended" for courts
to evaluate effectively).
9 See Chicago Board of Realtors, Inc v City of Chicago, 819 F2d 732, 745 (7th Cir 1987)
(Posner concurring) ("Thus it is clear that the Chicago ordinance does not deny 'substantive due
process,' though not because it is a reasonable ordinance, which it is not.").
10 See Coniston, 844 F2d at 467 (noting critically that the rejection of Coniston's permit
was likely a protectionist act designed to insulate existing building owners from new competition).
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claim." His implicit gloss asks, why should anyone take the last objec-
tion seriously when it is cut from the same cloth as the first two? To
sense how Posner's mind works requires a close reading of each por-
tion of his opinion with an eye on two themes. The first is the underly-
ing case for constitutional deference to political branches in property-
related cases. The second looks at his treatment of the relevant prece-
dents. That journey is instructive, for readers always learn more from
Posner's mistakes than from the sound insights of lesser thinkers.
II. A QUICK TOUR OF TAKINGS
On the takings issue, Coniston filed its initial complaint before
the Supreme Court gave its cautious blessing to suits demanding com-
pensation for total temporary takings in First English Evangelical Lu-
theran Church v Los Angeles County." But even if we get past plead-
ing points on waiver and amendment, there is in principle the ticklish
question of whether the denial of a permit counts as a total loss of use,
because it is never clear what lesser uses might have been allowed. In
any event, First English contains an elastic exception to the basic rule
that removes the duty of compensation during any "normal" planning
period. In addition, Posner notes without any comment that landown-
ers cannot sue in federal court until they have exhausted their admin-
istrative remedies," which was not done here.14 This procedural obsta-
cle course is designed to ensure that zoning challenges based on the
federal Constitution never darken the doorsteps of the federal courts.
In any event, the modest takings bubble in First English has been ef-
fectively punctured because of the feeble damages allowable for tem-
porary takings." Posner breaks no new ground here.
Undeterred, Posner continues with his digression by noting, with
clinical indifference, that the market value formula of compensation
necessarily confiscates the subjective value of the inframarginal land-
owner, because, as he rightly says, not everyone has a for sale sign in
11 See id at 469 (distinguishing between the due process requirements for legislative versus
adjudicative decisionmaking, and finding that the requirements were sufficiently satisfied in this case).
12 482 US 304, 321 (1987) (holding that "where the government's activities have already
worked a taking of all use of property, no subsequent action by the government can relieve of
the duty to provide compensation for the period during which the taking was effective").
13 See Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v Hamilton Bank, 473 US 172,
194-95 (1985) (finding that a property owner can have no takings claim against the government
unless they have availed themselves of state and federal compensatory remedies and been de-
nied just compensation).
14 See Coniston, 844 F2d at 463.
15 For some of the complications, see Wheeler v City of Pleasant Grove (Wheeler V), 896
F2d 1347, 1351 (11th Cir 1990) (awarding $59,841 in damages based on applying the market rate
of return to the "value lost as a result of the regulatory restrictions," which was $525,000).
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front of his property." But his oddest diversion goes to the "public
use" requirement, which he says may carry with it the negative impli-
cation that the state owes no compensation under the Takings Clause
when it takes private property solely for private use, leaving the open-
ing for a remedy under the Due Process Clause. A strange form of
textualism lies behind this suggestion, for it supposes that the greater
government abuse is one that receives no constitutional protection at
all. Posner seeks to close this gap by invoking the Due Process Clause,
but to no avail, because ironically that clause in connection with sub-
stantive due process claims has been read to contain the same public
use limitation." He then tries to give plausibility to this view with the
backhanded observation that the Supreme Court "may"-against the
constitutional text, of course-actually believe that the state cannot
take property, even with compensation, for private use." Yet ironically
the one point on which the Supreme Court is clear is that the public
use language bars local governments from forcing outright transfers
from one private party to a second." The problem with the Court's
formulation is that the endless array of conceivable benefits and pur-
poses makes it easy to clothe any transaction in the requisite gar-
ments. O The effect of Posner's musings is to make the takings law look
like a game without constitutional meaning and purpose. And since it
is just a game, it is easy to see why only the most minimal judicial scru-
tiny is needed.
16 See Coniston, 844 F2d at 464.
17 See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co v City of Chicago, 166 US 226,236 (1897):
But if, as this court has adjudged, a legislative enactment, assuming arbitrarily to take the
property of one individual and give it to another individual, would not be due process of
law as enjoined by the Fourteenth Amendment, it must be that the requirement of due
process of law in that amendment is applicable to the direct appropriation by the State to
public use and without compensation of the private property of the citizen.
18 See Coniston, 844 F2d at 464 (positing that the Takings Clause may be broad enough to
encompass takings for private use and discussing Supreme Court opinions that support this
broad view of the Clause).
19 See Kelo v City of New London, 545 US 469, 477 (2005) ("[I]t has long been accepted
that the sovereign may not take the property of A for the sole purpose of transferring it to an-
other private party B, even though A is paid just compensation.").
20 See, for example, id at 480-83 (citing previous Supreme Court cases finding that trans-
fers of property from one set of private owners to another for purely economic purposes met the
"public use" requirement of the Takings Clause); Hawaii Housing Authority v Midkiff, 467 US
229, 241 (1984) ("But where the exercise of the eminent domain power is rationally related to a
conceivable public purpose, the Court has never held a compensated taking to be proscribed by
the Public Use Clause.").
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III. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
After polishing off the Takings Clause, Posner turns to due proc-
ess, where he delights in shredding that well-known oxymoron. He
then takes after that "tenacious but embattled" principle by noting its
historical kinship with the traditional notion of "the law of the land,"
which may capture shades of substantive law but surely does not
clinch the case.2 It is worth noting that the first Justice Harlan never
used the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to apply
the Takings Clause to the states. Rather, his view depended on the
meaning of the phrase: "Due process of law as applied to judicial pro-
ceedings instituted for the taking of private property for public use
means, therefore, such process as recognizes the right of the owner to
be compensated if his property be wrested from him and transferred
to the public."2
There is, I think, good reason to ask whether the just compensa-
tion and public use requirements work themselves into the Constitu-
tion against state action through the Due Process Clause. My own
preference is to find these in the Privileges or Immunities Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, at least before its meaning was eviscer-
ated in the Slaughter-House Cases." But no matter where this twin
guarantee is located, it bears heavily on Posner's treatment of the un-
derlying problem. In his view, the historical issues take a back seat to
the institutional concern that the open-ended tests of substantive due
process give the courts an "uncanalized discretion" to invalidate all
legislation, including all zoning legislation.24 But, in reality, the tests
announced are far more stringent than this; even most zoning ordi-
nances sadly flunk them.
Posner cites with approval Euclid v Ambler Realty Co,2 which of
course decisively endorsed the low standard of review in zoning
cases.6 But the Realty Company's challenge to that zoning ordinance
did not ask the Supreme Court to become a roving commission dis-
pensing its own brand of social justice. The landowner questioned the
Village's decision to break an integrated sixty-eight acre plot border-
21 See Coniston, 844 F2d at 465.
22 Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co v City of Chicago, 166 US 226,236 (1897).
2 83 US 36,76 (1872) (upholding a state statute barring the slaughtering of animals within
designated areas; restricting the privileges and immunities of citizens to those in their capacity as
citizens of the United States). For my views, see generally Richard A. Epstein, Of Citizens and
Persons: Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 1 NYU J
L & Liberty 334 (2005).
24 See Coniston, 844 F2d at 465.
2 272 US 365 (1926).
26 See id at 391 (finding that a local ordinance zoning land for residential purposes "bears a
rational relation to the health and safety of the community").
[74:16891694
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ing on the Nickel Plate Railway into three divisions, thereby knocking
off around 75 percent of the value of the land. So now run the case
through Harlan's mill. Initially, it seems hard to deny that the right to
develop land is one of the sticks in the common law bundle of owner-
ship rights. Its loss in this case has a clear and measurable effect on
market value, for which no compensation is supplied. Perhaps one
could justify this loss in value by pointing to some external gains gen-
erated by the zoning decision. But clearly there were no health and
safety issues that tipped the balance in favor of the Village. The social
justification has to lie in some claim that other neighbors are better
off as a consequence of the restriction, but the zoning law also de-
presses nearby land by cutting out the opportunity to open comple-
mentary businesses. From a social point of view Euclid's zoning law
looks like a dead loser, regardless of its ostensible purpose. Justice
Sutherland in Euclid did mention how some zoning ordinances could
deal with fire and contagion, but never paused to explain why that
particular zoning ordinance served any of these legitimate police
power ends.2 But wholly out of context, he did make an ominous ref-
erence about how apartment houses could become "parasites" in re-
spectable neighborhoods.
So the law starts off on the wrong foot because it denies the most
powerful due process/takings claim imaginable in cases of land use
regulation. If the private property includes the loss of private property
rights short of actual dispossession, Euclid presents the ideal case to
lower the boom on a local government. The zoning ordinance produces
great losses for the owner and no systematic gains for any one else.
Posner is keenly aware that after Euclid the takings law gives oo-
dles of protection to someone who is thrown off a sliver of his land,
but does little (not quite nothing) for owners stripped of a substantial
chunk of their use and development rights.9 Of course, rational own-
ers would gladly surrender the former in order to keep the latter, but
Posner does not raise a peep in protest of a distinction that makes no
economic sense. All the codification efforts in the Restatement of Ser-
27 See id (stating that zoning regulations "excluding from residential areas the confusion
and danger of fire, contagion, and disorder, which in greater or less degree attach to the location
of stores, shops, and factories" are constitutionally valid).
28 See id at 394 ("[in such sections very often the apartment house is a mere parasite,
constructed in order to take advantage of the open spaces and attractive surroundings created by
the residential character of the district.").
29 See Coniston, 844 F2d at 466 ("[I1n cases under the takings clause the courts distinguish
between taking away all of the owner's rights to a small part of his land and taking away
(through regulation) a few of his rights to all of his land, and grant much broader protection in
the first case.").
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vitudes - were intended to remove the divide between easements
(which allow others to enter property) and covenants (which restrict
land use) that forms the arthritic backbone of the regulatory state.
Posner justifies his version of the status quo by surmising that
"[njo one thinks" that substantive due process should be read so
broadly as to cover all cases of "erroneous zoning decisions."" But the
defenders of strong property rights never make that claim. They (all
right, we) only insist that reasonable means be used to achieve reason-
able health and safety objectives (of which there were none in Conis-
ton). Given the uncertainty of future events, all the law can expect of
regulators is that they make good faith and reasonable efforts to avoid
overbroad restrictions. The due process/takings challenge won't bite
where the zoning board uses the wrong ratio to determine the number
of parking spaces needed per apartment in a new high rise. But it counts
as a huge leap of faith to say that difficult borderline cases make the
health and safety standard unworkable so that a local zoning board
should be allowed to zone for whatever reasons it chooses.
More concretely, if Posner is correct that anticompetitive and
protectionist acts remove virtually all protection given by the Due
Process Clause and Takings Clause, then the entire enterprise of prop-
erty protection is at an end. After all, it is not hard to conjure up at
least some pro- or anticompetitive justification for any system of land
use regulation. But by the same token, Posner offers no explanation as
to why requiring a health or safety justification would lead to the in-
validation of government initiatives that were worth preserving. It is
an odd case for him to play the institutional trump card, without any
consideration of how any alternative standard might play out in easy
cases, perhaps to improve the operation of local governments which,
as Posner so well knows, are rife with factionalism and local prefer-
ences, which a landowner, unlike a developer, cannot counteract by
exercising the exit option. Nor is there any glimmer of recognition
that his supposed multifaceted institutional justifications could in
principle play out equally well with the outright confiscation of land.
Why bother to monitor these if courts have no institutional capabili-
ties to second-guess planning commissions? Take the Posner institu-
tional objection seriously and every constitutional takings challenge to
land use regulation is DOA- which is what he wants.
30 Restatement (First) of Property (Servitudes) (1944).
31 Coniston, 844 F2d at 466.
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IV. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
The discussions on takings and substantive due process are, of
course, preliminary maneuvers. The sorry state of takings law cannot
be laid at Posner's feet, for it is the brainchild of the majority of Su-
preme Court justices who have long shared this same world view. The
same cannot be said, however, of the procedural due process challenges
in Coniston, which go several steps beyond what the law otherwise re-
quires. Coniston's argument raises two key questions. The first is
whether the proceeding in question is an adjudicative one to which
some due process rights attach, and the second asks, what rights, if any,
should attach in adjudicative hearings. On both these questions, Posner
takes the common deferential stance in land use to new heights.
A. Legislative versus Adjudicative Hearings
Administrative law contains a solid distinction between legisla-
tive and adjudicative action. That distinction was easier to apply be-
fore the rise of the administrative state with all its hybrid bodies. But
in a world populated with boards and commissions, it is harder to clas-
sify particular functions. Is the body in question formulating policy, or
is it deciding existing cases in accordance with preexisting policies?
Within the administrative context, the requirements of procedural due
process attach to adjudicative procedures where the property of one,
or a very small group of persons, stands alone against the full might of
the law. The same individualized protections are not needed to vali-
date legislative action where political coalitions can take up the slack.
For example, in Bi-Metallic Investment Co v Colorado State Board,"
Justice Holmes held that the requirements of procedural due process
did not apply to a proportionate tax increase for all property owners
within the taxing district: "Where a rule of conduct applies to more
than a few people it is impracticable that every one should have a di-
rect voice in its adoption."" That same distinction has been carried
over into the zoning context. The basic approach treats initial zoning
plans as legislative. Rezonings are generally treated the same way, but
the rule can shift in cases of "spot zoning" that target one or just a few
individual parcels. Individual permit applications are invariably
32 239 US 441 (1915).
33 Id at 445.
34 See, for example, Fasano v Board of County Commissioners, 164 Ore 574, 507 P2d 23,
26-28 (1973) (accepting the Board as the governing body and finding that its rezoning decision
was a judicial exercise of authority, and was therefore held to a stricter standard of review in
determining whether the change conformed to the comprehensive plan), disapproved on other
grounds by Neuberger v City of Portland, 288 Ore 585,607 P2d 722,725 (1980).
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treated as adjudicative actions requiring procedural protections-
except in Coniston, which treated the decision of the Village Board of
Trustees as a legislative act.
In reaching this astonishing conclusion, Posner cites Bi-Metallic
approvingly, but does not pause to mention the radically different fac-
tual contexts in the two cases. He then argues that "[i]t is not labels
that determine whether action is legislative or adjudicative."15 He then
ignores totally the spot zoning cases and wrongly states that it is "usu-
ally true" that zoning law treats approvals or disapprovals of site plans
as legislative acts. To support this determination he notes that the Vil-
lage Board of Trustees is the "governing body" of Hoffman Estates
and, further, that its own zoning ordinances contain no explicit criteria
on which to base its judgments."
Wholly unconvincing: the Village Board of Trustees occupied two
roles, and only a love of labels could suggest that it acts in a legislative
capacity in reviewing a specific recommendation from the Plan Commis-
sion just because the Board takes on that role when it formulates general
zoning policy. If the denial of a particular application over the recom-
mendation of the Plan Commission is legislative, then nothing the Vil-
lage Board does is ever adjudicative, and all procedural protections are
gone so long as one body serves dual functions in small municipalities.
Nor is the lack of stated standards decisive. Recall that the ordi-
nance was incorporated into the annexation agreement, which Conis-
ton wanted in order to protect its interests down the road. It makes no
sense to think that its inclusion was intended to give the Village Board
carte blanche on zoning applications. The combination of the setting,
ordinance, and annexation agreement makes the Board's decision the
quintessential adjudicative act.
B. Uses of the Permit Power
The next question asks what happens once permit denials are
treated as adjudicative actions." To answer that question, start with
this simple proposition: the state never becomes a co-owner of prop-
erty simply through the exercise of its permit power. Let that be done,
and then the state could wipe out the value of private property in two
steps instead of one. First, it passes a permitting statute-or two or
three-and then, pursuant to its self-proclaimed powers as a co-owner,
it denies the original owner the right to build or use his property. No
35 Coniston, 844 F2d at 468.
36 Id.
37 For my general view on this question, see Richard A. Epstein, The Permit Power Meets
the Constitution, 81 Iowa L Rev 407 (1995).
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system of private property could survive if states could use permits to
bootstrap themselves into that dominant position. It is for this reason
that permits, no matter what the context, can never be denied at will,
but must only be denied for cause. The situation is the polar opposite
of cases when private property owners exercise their right to exclude,
which can (at least at common law) be done for a good reason, a bad
reason, or no reason at all.
This distinction between state permits and private owners has
powerful functional roots. The landowner may be able to exclude any-
one from his land without cause, but there are normally lots of other
owners, who, either for love or money, are willing to let some people
in. The power over this or that land is not a power over the market,
given these numerous close substitutes. When, as with traditional
common carriers, a property owner traditionally did exert that level of
control, then the legal rule quickly shifted so that all customers of the
railroad had the right to service on reasonable and nondiscriminatory
terms.8 The rejections had to be for cause-an inability to pay the
proper fare, the risk of disruptive passengers, overcrowding, and the
like. Today, common carriers usually operate in competition with each
other, so that it is a fair question whether the older duty limitation on
service should continue to apply. But a parallel erosion of power by
new entry never happens to state agencies armed with the permit
power. Nor does the presence of two permitting agencies increase the
options for the property owner. Multiple permits only compound the
problem by forcing an owner to comply with both restrictions at the
same time. The "for cause" for rejection test is a weak but necessary
reed to stand against the legal monopoly of the permitting body.
Any for-cause test with teeth has to contain two components. The
first addresses the ends in view. Allow an infinite set of reasons to jus-
tify the denial of a permit and we are back in the at-will universe for
permitting authorities. What subclass of reasons then count as legiti-
mate? It is hard to give a comprehensive answer that works for all
permits, but with respect to land use permits, health, safety, pollution,
and environmental risks rise to the top of pile. Questions of infrastruc-
ture support and density matters often come into play as well. Finally,
38 For the origins of the doctrine, see Allnut v Inglis, 104 Eng Rep 206, 210-11 (KB 1810)
(Lord Ellenborough) (finding that "if, for a particular purpose, the public have a right to resort
to his premises and make use of them, and he have a monopoly in them for that purpose, if he
will take the benefit of that monopoly, he must as an equivalent perform the duty attached to it
on reasonable terms"); for its extension to common carriers, see H.W. Chaplin, Limitations upon
the Right of Withdrawal from Public Employment, 16 Harv L Rev 555, 556-57 (1903) (describing
the fundamental law of common carriers as requiring carriers to carry any member of the public
at all times, to serve each person on the same terms, and to charge reasonable rates).
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considerations of community "character" and neighborhood "aesthet-
ics" sometimes make the list, but only with obvious misgivings about
their elastic nature. The basic insight is that the inevitable physical
adjacencies between neighbors tend to enlarge the class of relevant
externalities, which is likely to be more extensive than, say, in service
markets. But on the back end, the one class of justifications that can-
not meet the standard are the economic protectionism and anticom-
petitive behavior that Posner's brutal realism embraces in Coniston.
The next question is what set of rules and procedures help ensure
that a governing board uses its power to advance this (largish) class of
legitimate ends. Transparency is an important value, which in turn re-
quires meeting the familiar due process requirement that an adminis-
trative body give its reasons when it turns down a permit application.
In this connection, we sometimes face the reverse vice of wearing
down applicants with a war of attrition by happily giving frustrated
applicants too many reasons for administrative refusals or delays on
too many occasions.3
It should be evident on this case that the minimal performance of
the Hoffman Estates Board is deficient both with respect to the ends
it invokes and the (want of) reasons that it offers to support those
goals. As Posner rightly observes, there is no reason to think that the
Village of Hoffman Estates has better information about the eco-
nomic prospects for real estate development." Yet some casual predic-
tion on that score is the only scrap of evidence offered to explain the
permit refusal. Posner infers from this feeble record some form of na-
ked protectionism of existing firms in the marketplace -which need
not be true. In reaching this striking conclusion, he relies on a decision
of the First Circuit in Creative Environments, Inc v Estabrook," which
challenged the decision of the Town of Bolton to block the plaintiff's
large new housing development.42 But the invocation of this case is
troubling. First read the full paragraph of Judge Campbell's thorough
opinion in Creative Environments, from which Posner quotes only the
italicized portion in the manner set out immediately below:
Plaintiffs also cite to Cordeco Development Corp. v. Santiago
Vasquez, 539 E2d 256 (1st Cir.) .. . . In Cordeco, another equal
39 Tventy-year periods are not uncommon for the process to run its course before the
United States Supreme Court. One of many recent cases that required the stamina of a mara-
thon runner is Monterey v Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd, 526 US 687 (1999) (resolving a
case in which the central dispute between the parties was nearly twenty years old).
40 See Coniston, 844 F2d at 466 (noting that the plaintiffs' information on how to maximize the
value of the property is "almost certainly a better guess than governmental officials would make").
41 680 F2d 822,833 (1st Cir 1982).
42 See id at 833.
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protection case, this court affirmed a section 1983 judgment
against Puerto Rican officials who, the jury found, had improp-
erly denied the plaintiff a permit to extract sand while granting
such permits to a more influential, politically connected rival. The
federal basis for liability in Cordeco, however, was never ex-
pressly litigated . .. and the facts of that case-involving officials
favoring a politically powerful, wealthy businessman with a pub-
lic license over a less influential but equally deserving competi-
tor-are significantly different from the present case.... Here it
is merely indicated that town officials are motivated by parochial
views of local interests which work against plaintiffs' plan and
which may contravene state subdivision laws. Apparently no rival
developer advocating CEI's ambitious plan would have had more
success than Barber. Plaintiffs would thus have us rule that the
due process clause to the United States Constitution was violated
when Bolton's Planning Board, for the purpose of protecting
what it viewed as the town's basic character, openly interpreted
state subdivision laws and a state court decision in ways which
frustrated plaintiffs' large-scale housing development of a par-
ticular design."
The italicized portion is then embedded in a new sentence that reads:
Thus we agree with the First Circuit's decision in Creative Envi-
ronments ... that the fact "that town officials are motivated by
parochial views of local interests which work against plaintiffs'
plan and which may contravene state subdivision laws" (or, we
add, local ordinances) does not state a claim of denial of substan-
tive due process.
The devilish switch in meaning should be evident when the two
passages are compared. By way of background, note that Judge
Campbell in Creative Environments stressed that the Bolton planning
board gave seven separate and specific reasons for rejecting the de-
veloper's proposal,4' which cured any defect of indefiniteness that
might have lodged in the governing statute. The reference to "paro-
chial" motives in Creative Environments offered not the slightest sup-
port for permit denials based on rank protectionism or anticompeti-
tive behavior. Indeed, Creative Environments condemns those corrupt
practices in Cordeco, which explains why that permit was properly
denied while this one was properly allowed. Taken in context, the
43 Id at 832-33 (emphasis added).
44 Coniston, 844 F2d at 467.
45 Creative Environments, 680 F2d at 826.
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word "parochial" refers to the desire of the local commission to retain
the town's "basic character," which is one of those elusive aesthetic
objectives that sometimes operates as a shield for anticompetitive be-
havior, but which in and of itself falls today within the legitimate ends
for the planning power. Campbell highlights the subdued nature of his
uneasiness about what Bolton characterizes as the reason for the de-
nial of the permit by putting the words "it is merely indicated" before
the words Posner quotes. When Posner carefully excises these words
he turns Creative Environments completely on its head. A case that is
foursquare against economic protectionism is read as supportive of
the very proposition it rejects.
V. REMEDY
Posner's evisceration of procedural due process in Coniston made
it unnecessary for him to decide what remedy Coniston should have
against the Village Board. The range of possibilities tracks those avail-
able in principle when zoning restrictions are found to constitute a
regulatory taking. At one time, the supposed remedy for these viola-
tions was a decree that invalidated the planning commission's order,
which allowed it to start again a second time." And a third time until,
who knows.... The futility of this remedy should be obvious. It allows
the local government to delay land development indefinitely by mak-
ing a series of denials, each which offers a tiny variation from the pre-
vious decree. The decision to reject all damage awards was justified by
the need to avoid "chilling" local planning authorities. By looking only
at private abuse, it creates ideal test-tube conditions for endless gov-
ernment abuse. As noted earlier, First English contemplated interim
damages, and that too has proved an inglorious failure because the
few dollars it offers after protracted litigation are too small to matter.
No rational private party wants to incur additional expense and risk
further delay by bringing a second lawsuit.
The feebleness of invalidation and interim damages are every bit
as great in this area. The Village Board in Coniston behaved in wholly
arbitrary and capricious fashion. Its bad faith seems palpable, even
when measured against the modest procedural due process protec-
tions in the land use context. To have remanded the case for further
consideration is to play into the Village's hands by wrapping the pro-
ject in more red tape. The factual record, moreover, pushes none of
4 See, for example, Agins v City of Tiburon, 24 Cal 3d 266,598 P2d 25, 30-32 (1980) (con-
cluding that the balance between protecting property interests and affording public officials
authority to act is best struck by "preserving for the landowner, in appropriate cases, declaratory
relief or mandamus remedies").
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the hot buttons for state intervention in the land use context. It is con-
sistent with a prior unblemished track record. The Plan Commission
was already on board. The site raises no sensitive environmental con-
cerns. Nor were the land uses incompatible for the neighborhood,
given that Coniston owned all (or at least most) of the land surround-
ing the seventeen-acre plot. Coniston asked not for compensation, but
for issuance of the permit. On these facts the proper disposition seems
clear: Posner should have awarded the permit, if only as a reminder
that blatant unlawful behavior does not pay even for government offi-
cials. But sad to say, his strong constitutional priors led him woefully
astray. And we are left to ponder why a judge who knows so much
about the dangers of government power and the virtues of the market
is content to use his great literary and intellectual powers to make a
jumble of what should have been an easy case.
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